Text Dump

The “Why I’m interested in my topic” section of the project Google Doc

How can we prevent law enforcement agencies from overstepping their authority in an era of seeming constitutional crisis? I’m interested in this because under the current presidential administration, sweeping executive orders have been made to use federal law enforcement agencies (and even the military) to carry out agendas (vice versa too, state/local enforcing federal), such as mass deportations. Some agencies, however, are doing this in problematic ways, like using state and local laws as cover to stop those they believe to be illegal immigrants. This has had a profound impact on my community, and I want to know how to help.

“Where’s my thinking” update on Writing Partners (Feb. 19)

Quick Summary of my first article: While federal law enforcement is often viewed through the lens of federal agencies, many statutes also empower state attorneys general to enforce federal law. This decentralized, state-driven enforcement allows states to influence the intensity of enforcement and interpret federal law according to their interests.

think that this is a good article, but i'm going to try and find a better one. However, it does lead to the "answer" of an important question, which is can states prevent laws against their interest from being enforced in extreme ways, as is being proposed by certain federal agencies right now. I still need to find an article that addresses the opposite, which is can federal agencies enforce local and state laws in order to find probable cause to bust somebody on a federal crime they may not yet have evidence for, but could gain through an investigation on a local level.

They Say, I Say sentences

The National Immigration Law Center states that in many cases, the Department of Homeland Security and one of its law enforcement branches, ICE, often comb through local law enforcement detentions to find possible suspects of immigration crimes. Often this means minor crimes can put someone on ICE’s radar, and puts those at risk of being profiled at an even higher risk of being federally detained. While many Americans might have a movie-like impression of federal agents, thinking they have the most authority, they can be arrested by local and state police officers in some cases, including those of gross misconduct. When debating over who has the power to enforce what laws, many mayors and governors believe it is not their jurisdiction’s responsibility to help enforce federal laws. For example, many sanctuary cities have protested the idea that their agencies will face federal funding cuts should they fail to assist ICE in arresting illegal immigrants. On the other hand, more conservative mayors and governors find it to be their responsibility to assist in arresting those sought after by federal authorities, saying their communities face risk from federal fugitives just as much as a local one.

Summaries of my sources from my project Google Doc or from Writing Partners

While federal law enforcement is often viewed through the lens of federal agencies, many statutes also empower state attorneys general to enforce federal law. This decentralized, state-driven enforcement allows states to influence the intensity of enforcement and interpret federal law according to their interests. Unlike traditional regulatory authority, state enforcement does not require states to regulate, enabling them to act in areas where state laws are preempted. Moreover, state attorneys general are often independent from state governments, representing different constituencies, which gives them distinct incentives and perspectives from other state actors in federal-state interactions.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has come to rely heavily on state and local criminal justice systems in order to find non–U.S. citizens who may be deportable and push them into the detention and deportation process. This collaboration is a complex and ill-defined entanglement consisting of a web of unregulated and overlapping Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) programs and mechanisms whose parameters and operations easily mutate, that are not restrained by formal regulations or mechanisms of accountability, that operate with little transparency, and that do not closely monitor or hold accountable the criminal justice systems that arrest and detain the people who end up in ICE custody. One particularly alarming result of this entanglement is that it is becoming more common for citizens, too, to be swept into the detention-deportation system.This is now a deeply embedded and institutionalized scheme that will not disappear if our immigration system is ever substantially overhauled. The process ignores individuals’ guilt or innocence, whether arrests were the result of racial profiling 2 (indeed, the programs themselves create an incentive for racial profiling 3 ), and whether the noncitizens swept into the detention-deportation system are adequately represented, or understand the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, or face prolonged detention because of an ICE immigration hold request. DHS’s use of state criminal justice systems also depends on the application of legal rules that are unacceptable in other areas of law, such as searching out for removal people who were convicted of crimes—minor or major—that were not grounds of deportation when they were committed. And it depends on characterizing as a “criminal alien” anyone with a criminal conviction,4 regardless of the severity of the conviction or the existence of compelling equities in the person’s favor, even when the conviction was not the basis of the removal order.
George Floyd’s death at the hands of a police officer in May 2020 set off protests throughout the country, and we continue to reckon with a long history of police abuse and violence and the lack of accountability of responsible officers and police departments. Federalism is often blamed for this failure. Law enforcement has been a local matter since the colonial era and, still today, police departments remain largely resistant to federal oversight, especially on matters concerning racial justice. For its part, the U.S. Justice Department’s infrequent use of its statutory authority to investigate police agencies that engage in a “pattern or practice” of constitutional violations and of conditional grants to push police reform reveals a lack of political will to encroach on local domains.Yet, federalism doesn’t explain why the states themselves have not supervised the police more. While direct federal control of police officers would violate the constitutional system of dual sovereignty according to Printz v. United States, 2 states do have the power to regulate the police but, for the most part, have chosen not to. The limited, too often lacking, responses of governors to police shootings make this point all too clear. Moreover, doctrinal accounts of federalism that maintain clear boundaries between local and federal spheres do not explain a paradoxical development in American law enforcement over the twentieth century: the remarkable growth of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI or Bureau3) amid the persistence of localism. This history is especially puzzling given that, during the Bureau’s first fifty years or so, from 1908 to 1960, it devoted a significant portion—in many years a lion’s share—of its caseload to investigating one particular crime: auto theft.4 What were the implications of the federal government’s sustained involvement in the pursuit of theft, a traditionally local matter?
The Bush administration is considering expanding the role of state and local police in enforcing immigration laws, a shift that is being justified as part of the war on terrorism. While proponents argue it could help prevent terrorism, the move is unlikely to be effective, as most of the 9/11 hijackers entered the U.S. legally. Involving local police could lead to racial profiling, civil rights abuses, and strained relations with immigrant communities, making them less likely to cooperate with law enforcement. Additionally, focusing on arresting illegal immigrants would divert resources from other important duties. The solution to enhancing national security lies in increasing the number of Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) agents, not in expanding local police powers.
Some local leaders resist federal efforts to enforce mass deportations of undocumented immigrants, arguing that such enforcement harms public safety and public health. Sanctuary cities have policies that limit cooperation with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, but these local policies are at odds with federal law, which preempts state-level immigration policies.Some states, like Texas and Florida, require local governments to cooperate with ICE, while others, like Oregon and Illinois, prohibit it. The state of Texas has gone further, enacting its own immigration laws, such as S.B. 4, which criminalizes illegal entry and empowers local officers to arrest individuals suspected of being undocumented. These laws are currently being challenged in court.
The Unified Police Department (UPD) dismissed a traffic citation issued against a driver after an encounter with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents on January 26, 2025. The ICE agents claimed the driver swerved toward them, but when UPD officers sought clarification, the agents provided inconsistent responses. The driver, handcuffed during the incident, denied swerving and reported emotional distress over threats made by ICE. Although ICE agents requested the citation, UPD officers clarified they had not witnessed the alleged incident and suggested ICE provide written statements or testify in court, which two agents declined to do. The next day, UPD reviewed surveillance footage, which contradicted ICE's claim, showing no swerving. As a result, UPD dismissed the citation and raised concerns with ICE about the inaccuracies and inconsistencies in their agents' statements.

Text of all my annotations

What are the private efforts? private prisons or is there private law enforcement. Are there cases in which the attorney general moves through local and state LE agencies to make arrests or does that have to be done by federal agents. Can this kind of enforcement lead to miscarriages of justice?Should we focus more on holding the agencies that funnel or the agencies that prey on local detainees more? What made such practice acceptable in this area of law: packed courts, special counsels… When do ICE agents accompany local agents on a regular days work, and when they do, are any law enforcement actions they take truly constitutional. How do they help if they only make the detainers waste more resources on prisoners that aren't actually their own. Serious crime: will high class misdemeanors count? or will it only be federal charges. Hold request- a request by the agency to hold a detainee for them while they process any federal/immigration related charges. Which governments allow hold requests for long time, and is there a basis for fourth amendment violation lawsuits on the part of the local detainer? What can we do to stop this then? Local police officers are not allowed to prevent someone from being detained on a federal crime, but can investigate local ones that they're involved in. Officers do not have to make charges recommended by federal authorities. It also appears the federal officers did not use their authority to cite the civilian in anything - why? Local police wont enforce particular federal laws. Constitutional or Statutory authority? Secondary offense for local police. Can city councils override these laws and prevent their own police forces from doing this? Remember - ICE didn't exist until 2003, which added agents and broadened power, keeping local enforcement at bay. Racial biases come into play too. Cities cannot prevent, but can refuse to cooperate. Local sanctuary orders could still stand. What other states do home rules exist in.Criminal intent: knowledge of crime needed? (example, not knowing the smuggling was happening). For example: UT state legislature making Salt Lake City and it's problems a focus of their sessions.

DMU Timestamp: March 13, 2025 19:03